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N THE l930s, when widespread unemployment
was the economic malaise threatening the foundation
of a free society, Professor John NI. Keynes, of King’s
College, prescribed fiscal activism as a cure. Now in
the 1970s, rampant inflation is seen by some to
threaten the viability of a free society. Professor Mil-
ton Friedman, of the University of Chicago, has pre-
scribed indexation as an effective expedient to pre-
serve a free society.1
Indexation proposals, however, have encountered
historically less-than-enthusiastic receptions in many
quarters, in spite of the advocacy by many eminent
economists. This article seeks to unveil some of the
less apparent aspects of indexation in order that one
may achieve a deeper understanding of the theoretical
and practical issues involved.
GENERAL BACKGROUND
OF INDEXATION
Indexation, or index-linking, refers to proposals to
link the number of dollars to be delivered on a con-
tract to changes in some specified price index. Under
indexation, money would continue to be used as a
medium of exchange and as a measure of value, but
not necessarily as a standard for deferred payments.
In the event that the purchasing power of the dollar
changed as indicated by an agreed-upon price index,
contracts would be honored in terms of a unit of con-
‘Milton Friedman, ‘Using Escalators to Help Fight Inflation,”
Fortune (July 1974), pp. 94-97, 174-76.
stant purchasing power over “goods and services in
general.” Thus, an index-linked contract to deliver
$100 a year from today would deliver $110 if prices
rose by 10 percent over the interval, that is, if the
purchasing power of the dollar declined by Q09
percent.
Coverage
The basic objective of indexation is the insulation of
contractually-created claims on output from the ef-
fects of changes in the purchasing power of money
over goods and services in general (inflation or defla-
tion). In a completely indexed world, all of the fol-
lowing would he indexed: all private and public wage
and loan contracts including deposits at thrift institu-
tions, insurance, and pension contracts; social security
and other transfer payments, including unemploy-
ment compensation; and, of course, government tax
receipts. With respect to taxes, indexation would ap-
ply mainly to income taxes by adjusting the level of
exemption, the tax brackets, and the base of asset
valuations. The progressive income tax rate itself
would remain invariant for a given social decision
regarding the relative size of the government sector.
Since profit shares are noncontractual items and are
‘With changes in relative prices, the constant purchasing
power of money over “goods and services in general” neces-
sarily implies variable purchasing power over at least some
of the goods and services in the basket; that is, with rela-
tive price changes, the “index number problem” inevitably
creeps in. See Ragnar Frisch, “Annual Sun’ey of Economic
Theory: The Problem of Index Numbers,” Econometrica
(1936), pp. 1-38.
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determined residually, they would not be indexed.’
However, to the extent that such contracts as those
for purchases of materials are indexed, it appears
likely’ that profit shares of some intermediate goods
producers would be indirectly protected through
indexation.
Even money would be indexed under a completely
indexed economy.4 In a pure currency economy with-
out private money producers (banks), indexation of
currencies could he facilitated by dating them, such
as Sylvio Gessell’s sttunp money proposal.’ With bank-
created money and legal reserve requirements, the
task would be more difficult and would require fre-
quent intervention by the central bank,
Experiences With Indexation
A review of foreign experience with regard to
indexation shows a wide variety of practices with re-
spect to the classes of contracts indexed, the extent
of the compensation allowed, and the choices of in-
dices to svhich the contracts~are tied.°l’he most coin-
prehensive indexation was provided initially by Fin-
land and then by Israel, France, and most recently
by Brazil. In addition to employment contracts, vari-
ous loan, insurance, and pension contracts have been
tied to a number of price indices as well as to the
price of specific foreign exchange and commodities,
such as that of gold Napoleons in tile case of France.
The People’s Republic of China first introduced the
indexation of bank deposits in 1949, followed by Fin-
land in 1955, and more recently by Brazil in 1965.
Experience with indexing loan contracts in the
United States and the United Kingdom has been
scanty. Irving Fisher prevailed cr1 the Rand Kardex
Company in 1925 to issue bonds tied to the wholesale
price index, but these bonds were soon converted
into preferred stocks and ordinary bonds.7 The United
3
Milton Friedman, Price Theory (Chicago: Aldine Publishing
Company, 1962), p. 99.
~William J. Baurnol, “The Escalated Economy and the Stim—
dating Effects of Inflation,” in Essays in Honour of Marco
Fanna, vol. 2, ed. Tnflio Bagiotti (Padova, Italy: Edizioni
Cedarn, 1966), pp. 96-104.
‘For a full discussion of Ceselus proposal see John H. Keynes,







David Finch. “Purchasing Power Guarantees for Deferred
Payments,” International Monetary Fund Staff Papers
(Febrna,y 1956), pp. 1-22; Miroslav Kriz, “Inflation: l’he
Case for Indexing,” and Nigel Aithaus, “The Case for the
U.K. Indexing Guts,” Euromoney (June 1974), pp. 19-27;
and United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin Amer-
ica, “Index Clauses in Deferred Payments;’ Economic But-
letin for Latin America (October 1957), pp. 73-89.
7
Eeonomic Commission for Latin America, ‘‘Index Clauses
in Deferred Payments,” p. 76.
Kingdom did not adopt indexation for loan contracts
until 197.3. The number of people whose incomes are
partially protected by indexation in the United States
has increased dramatically in the past several years,
mainly through the wider use of escalator clauses in
labor contracts, the adoption of indexed social secu-
rity payments, and tise food stamp program.
Failure to Gain General Support
Indexation has historically enjoyed the support of
many illustrious economists, such as Stanley Jevons,
Alfred Marshall, Irving Fisher and John Ni. Keynes.
Until the end of World War II, however, indexation
had failed to elicit the support of policymakers or
capture the interest of the general public.~Tile funda-
mental reason appears to be that tile economists who
advocated such proposals had not designed an ac-
ceptable means for their implementation. They tended
to emphasize tile desirability of tile proposal as if
we Ilad a clean sheet of paper to write upon.”°
Too often they failerl to consider explicitly- how tile
new arrangement would affect existing institutions and
outstanding commitments. Often missing was a com-
prehensive analysis of the likely distribution of tile
total costs of transition An important subsidiary ex-
planation for tile failure of mdexation to elicit popular
support appears to be the implicit public judgment
that the economics profession has not, as yet, provided
a generally acceptable index of price change.’°
THE CASE PRESENTED
FOR INDEXATION
The fundamental case for indexation, in essence,
rests on the claim that it would approximate the re-
sults associated with a stable price level — even in
tile absence of price level stability.” The theoretical
aF’or a - historical overview, see Finch, “Pnrchasing Power
Cuarantees,” pp. 1-22.
i~1,VoodrowWilson’s first inaugurai aridress in The Inaugural
Addresses of the American Presidents, annotated by Davis
Newton Lott (New York: Ilolt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961),
p. 201. Tllis pam.-tiai qm.mote refers to tile founrhng of the
Federal Reserve System and is displayed inside the en-
trance to the Federal Reserve Building in Wasilington,
D.C.: “We shaH neal rvith our economic system as it is and
as it may be modified, not as it might he if we had a clean
sileet of paper to write upon; and step hy step we shall
make it what it should he,”
“‘Benjamin Klein, “The Measuremneilt and Social Costs of
inflation: -The Recent Inflation and Our Nen’ Monetary
Standard,’ unpublished paper ( Los Angeles: University of
California, Los Angeles, 1974)-
‘Irving Fisher. The Purchasing Power of Money, 2nd ed- rev.
(New York: Augustus H. Kelley. Bookseller, 1963), and
Stabiliring the Dollar, (New York: Macmillan, 1920); Al-
fred Marshall, “Remedies for Fluctuations of General Prices,”
Memorials of Alfred Marshall, ed- Art:hur C. Pigou (New
York: Kelly and Milhnan, Inc., 1956), pp. 188-211.
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presumption ill favor of price level stability is tuat a
fluctuating price level Ilas undesirable effects on the
distribution of income and on the efficient uti.lization
of resources. In addition, tile argument has recently
been advanced that innlexation would help to achieve
price level stability.
Distributive and Allocative Effects of a-n
Unstable Price Level
Inflations have real consequences wllen they are
imperfectly imticipated. Even when perfectly antici-
pated, mfiations- affect ailocative decisions,
Income Distribution — From tile point of view of
equity in the distribution of wealth, a stable price
level is superior since tile redistributional effects of a
less than fully anticipated inflation do not occur. The
distrihutional implications of imperfectly anticipated
inflation depend crucially on the existence of binding
contracts fixed in noiuinal monetary units (monetary
contracts, hereafter). For a given stock of existing
monetary contracts, be they loan or employment, the
magnitude of distributional effects depends positively
on the gap between tile actual and the anticipated
rate of inflation at the time of contract formation. If
all the transactor units were neither net monetary
debtors nor creditors, there svould be no distributional
effects.m2 In the event of an under-anticipated infla-
tion, net monetary debtors gain and net monetary
creditors lose; the conclusion is reversed in the event
of an over-anticipated inflation. The opposite distribu-
tional effects occur during a deflation.
The effects of imperfectly anticipated inflation on
the nlistribution of income generally have been eon—
siclereci undesirable. As Irving Fisher, who pioneered
the seminal distimlchon between anticipated and un-
anticipated inflation, put it, tile real evils of
cilanging price levels do riot lie ill tilese changes per
se, hut in tile fact they’ usually take us unaware. It has
heerl shown that tn) he forewarned is to he forearmed,
aunl that a foreknown change in price levels might he
so taken into a000umlt in the rate of interest as to
neutralize its evils.”Th
Resource Allocation — In a money economy the
commodity called money performs tile services of col-
iectirlg information and facilitating excilange between
all participants in transactions. In an anticipated stable
price environment, money is believed to promote
tmmReuhea A. Kessel arid A.rmea A. Aichian, “Effects ilf In-
flation,” Journal of Political Economy (December 1962),
pp. 521-37.
s:sFisher, Purchasing Power, p. 321,
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efficiency by freeing other resources fronl the task of
information gatheriugJ4
When the price level changes rapidly and is nsntici-
pated to any extent, the llolnhmlg of money becomes
more costly and its services less efficient. Other re-
sources are then dravvn i mItt) tile performance of money
services, leavmg less resources available for the pro-
ductioll of goods and services. This inflation-induced
reallocation of resources would shank the effective, as
distinct from tile nottonal, production po~ssibility rots—
tier, thereby reducing the anlourmt of goods and serv-
ices available for present and future comlsumpt~on.’’
I-ndexation Helps Ach-ie-ce P-rice Level
Stabil-ity
Traditionally, the advocacy of indexation was based
on distributive equity and, to a lesser degree, on allo-
cative efficiency grounds.1’ Recently, a tllird climen-
sion, based on a diagnosis of the tmderlynlg cause of
modern inflation, has been added. The modem day
proponents of indexation, represented by Professor
Friedman, have thrown in a sweetener. They claim
that indexatioml would tend to restore price level sta-
bility in an existimlg inflationary situation. Their posi-
tion can be interpreted to he based on tlmeir implicit
diagnosis that inflation is a political pllenomenon.’”tm
Their argument would run as follows. Inflation oc-
curs as aresult of all increase in a nations mone-y stock
ill excess of tile ability of the economy’ to produce
gcods and services. Usually’ the initial force leading to
nlflation is increased demand for government expendi-
tures to aid var;ons sectors of tile economy or segments
of tile population. Those demanchng greater govern-
ment services may not even he aware of the inflation-
ary consequences of their actions. It is only necessary
that in striving to better tlleir relative ahld absolute
tm4
Given imperfect foresight, a variable monetamy yardstick
implienl hy a fluctuating pm-ice level ) increases the nriecr—
tainty- associated rvitil ally- monetary contract and, assuming
aversion to purchasing power risk, increases the cost of
reaching agreement,
5
Robert Clower, “The Keynesian Counterrevolution: A The-
oretical Appraisal,” in The Theory of Intem’est Rates, ed.
Frank Ii. hahn amldl Frank P. R. Brechifog ( Lonnlon: Mac-
millan annl Co. Ltd., 1965), pp. 103-25. Clower’s distinction
between msotional annl efIective deusannl has been adapted
here.
‘°Fineh, “Purchasing Power Guarantees,” pp. 1-22, and W.
Stanley Jevons, Money amid the Mechanism of Exohange
New York: Twentieth Century- Press), p. 91.
17
Joan Robinson, “Quantity Theories Old and New,” Journal
of Money, credit and Banking (November 1970), p. 512.
The teniss “political phenomenon” was coined by Robinson
in the article. The juxtaposition of the term, with the resnlt-
ing imnpheations for indezation, is that of the author’s.PEOBRAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS OCTOBER 1074
positiosms they induce an accommodating increase in
the nominai money stock whicil is faster tllan would
he consistent with price level stability.
In this interpretation of tileir view, although the
villain fostering tlse inflation is the public demasmdiug
more from governnment, the basic cause is much
deeper, It is imbedded in our systenm of “advocacy
politics.”tmm Those who are ultimately resposmsible for
inflation are those who succeed in inducing the gov-
ernment to try to command a greater share of society’s
resources than is explicitly provided for in tax laws.
THE CASE PRESENTED
AGAINST INDEXATJON
1-listorically, indexation has been proposed at times
of on-going and relatively high rates of price change.
The case gesmerally advanced agaissst such a proposal
has been based primarily on the fact that we do not
start with a “cleass sheet of paper to write upon.”
Since at any moment there exist otststanding con-
tracts which are not indexed, it is argued that indexa-
thin would tend to cause problems for those indi-
viduals ammd institutions involved in sttch contracts.
An additional standard argument against the index-
ing proposal lsas been timat the adoption of suclm a
proposal would tend to weaken stspport for anti-infla-
tion policies. More recently, some have contended
that indexation would tend to affect adversely the
tenns of international trade for an open economy.
The following statements were made by the Coun-
cil of Econonmic Advisers and others in 1952 in opposi-
tion to the proposed issuance of a purchasing power
bond by the Treasury. These statements are represent-
ative of the arguments used against indexation in
generai.mo
Wo-uld weaken support for anti-i-nflation actions
The issuance of a purchasing power bond would
imply a defeatist attitude toward the problem of in-
flation. Widespread ownership of purchasing power
bonds would add another group to those who think
timemselves sheltered from the effects of inflation, and
would weaken public support of a stabilization
program.
The proposal for purchasing power bonds applies
the principle only to a limited amount of bnsnds.
‘rhe Covensment would thus add an admittedly at-
tm5George P. Shmsltz. ‘Reflections on Political Economy,” Jour-
nal of Finance (May 1974). pp. 323-30.
iiftj5 Congress, Joint Committee on the Economic Report,
Monetary Policy arid the Managernermt of time Public Debt,
Part 2, 82nd. Cong-, 2nd. sess., 1952, pp. 888-89, 1097, 1109.
traotive feature to one type of securi~’offered to
the public ill competition with other Covenmmemst
bonds and such other forms of assets or contracts as
ctsrrency, demand, time and savings accounts, shares
in sivings and loan associatiosms, and hfe insurance
policies. It is very likely that great pressure would
develop to extend the purchasing power clause also
to other investments, public asmd private. The greater
the number of persons who considered themselves
shielded from inflation, the greater wotmld be the
possibility of its occurrence.
Would ha-em sons-c individuals a-nd institutions
The demerits of the proposal are clear and com-
pelling. First the issuance of a Govensment bond,
the value of which was gsmaranteed in terms of pur-
chasing power, would place other forms of fixed-
imitert-st issvestmemlt at a nlecided disadm-antage and
would jeopardize the continued existence of such
other forms of investment. Tlmere would be raised,
therefore, the serious problem of fairness to savers
who already had their savings programs in effect.
Moreover, it appears inevitable that the adoption 0f
a constant purchasing power Government bond would
lead to a disastrous collapse in the value of out-
standing investment media.
Would be difficult to choose appropriate index
The determination of the index measuring the price
at which tlme bonds would be repaid would present
technical diffienslties and — no matter how decided —
would result in popular dissatisfaction.
Would weaken Icr-ms of international trade
A new dimensiosm is-I ternms of an open economy
cosmtext lmas been injected recently. Based on time prem-
ise that ~ndexation would accelerate inflation, Profes-
sor Murray L. Weidenbanm ohiects to indexation on
the ground tlmat:
We do not live in a closed economy. \-Ve already
have seen that accelerating inflation at home means
devaluation of our currency abroad. That brings de-
ter~om-atiorsin the terms r~ftranie annl nleciines in onsn
real stm-mmmdard of liviugdo
ASSESSMENT OF THE ARGUMENTS
Botls sides of time niehate appear to agree tlmat (1)
amm inflationless alternative is ideal, and tlmat (2) in-
dexation would prevemmt time emnergenee of inflation-
induced distributional effects (making “living wmth in-
flation” easier).
As mentioned earlier, time proponents tend to ignore
time transitional costs involved in adopting ismdexation,
2
—lnn-ay L. Weidenbaum, “The Case Against ‘Immdexing’,”
Dun’s (July 1974), p. 11.
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wimile time opponesmts tend to emphasize time likely- ef-
fects on the viahility of certain existing institutions.
\-Vitlm regard to the inflationary implications of adopt-
ismg immdexatiosm, time proponents and tIme opponents are
diametrically opposed.
To lmeip assess time pros ammd comms of indexatiosm, let
us first speculate on the properties of an idealized,
completely immdexed ecosmomy. Such speculation would
help to illuminate time possihie diffi‘cuities accompany-
ing any period of transition to mmecessarily iess-tlman-
conmpiete indexation.am
Some Properties of a Completely Indexed
Economy
Relative Price Changes — It might appear that in a
completely indexed economy, the relative prices of
various goods and services wouId remain constant,
Indexation, however, does not immunize a producer
from the risk of clmanges in relative prices incident to
changes in preferences, technology, or weatimer. A set
of relative (output) prices would still guide the allo-
cation of resources. Indexation is designed to insure
only the equality between time realized and the con-
tracted claims on output for the hired factors of
production.
Government’s Claims On Resources — The sham-c of
resources commanded by and flowing through the
government xvould ideally not deviate much from time
level that the pubhc “voluntarily” transfers through
its pledges of current and future tax payments. The
government would he deprived of the power to col-
lect inflationary taxes fronm time populace. Tlme income
tax system, witim ismdexed exemptions, asset revalua-
tions, and indexed tax brackets, would lose a con-
siderable amousmt of “built-in” stabili?-ation potency
widely thougimt to be associated with a progressive
tax structure.22 However, simould tIme government at-
tempt, through continued creation of money, to com-
mand more real resources than timose tendered in
explicit tax payments and private-sector lending, in-
flation would persist and the price level could ap-
proacim infinity.
Existence of inflation —An intriguing question aris-
ing in this context is the consequence of moving into
2
’A real-wnsdd exchange economy cannot have its nmoney
indexed arid still rensain viable, See Baumol, “The Escalated
Economy,” pp. 96-104, and Amotz Morag, On Tares ammd
Inflation (New York: Rasmdomn Hommse, Inc., 1965), pp.
144-73.
22”The Deceptive Lure of Indexatioms,” Bnmsimmess Week-. 25
May 1974, pp. 147-52.
a regime of indexation from time initial position of
immflatiosmamy disequilibrium. Without ismdexatiomm, a
gim’emm rate of ismfiation may eventually be eliminated
by time inflation-immducenl clmasmges in incosmme annh
wealth distribution. A conmpletely indexed economy
would be devoid of tlmis meclmanism, mmmmd Imence would
bring ismto time nmpemm the underlyismg conflict of hmterest
existing among time competing claimants.
Absence of Money illusion —Variotms forums of
“money illusion” wommini be eosnpletely ahsesmt from the
systemmm. Mosmey illusimm xvotmldi in’ absn’smt imm wage
negotiations. Time ahsemmce of nmoney iilnsinmn mm wage
perceptions would tend to “worsesm” time terms of the
short-rumm trade-off betweesm ismflatiomm and unemploy-
memmt in time sense tlmat no amount of inflatiomm would
tinny less nnesnpioysmmesmt; that is, time slmort- and long-
1-mm Plmiilips curves coincide, being vertical at time
natm-ai unenmploynment rate.25 Timis factor would tend
to reniucc oppositiosm to an aoti—immflatiosm pohcv. in
addition, time belmavior of inmterest rates 0mm ioasms as
well as negotiated wages would tesmnl to stabilize -sismce
time)’ woulnl smot emhody’ ammticipatiomms of immfiatiomm.
informational Efficiency of Markets — More exten-
sive use of time markets would he esmcouraged under
indexation for inter-tenmporal exchange asmd transfor-
mation of resources. To the extesmt tlmat the costs of
collecting asmd processing time immformation regarding
productive opportunities’ -are lowereni tlmrosmgim mar-
ket exclmammge, real output wotmlni be issereasenh for a
givesm structure of preferesmccs asmd a given state of
tecimsmology.
Risk-free Asset —hmdexation provides assets which
are free of purcimasing power risks. A short-tenmm
monetary asset in this regime, such as Treasury bills,
wonId be free of purchasing power risk in addition
to default ammd relative price risk associated with
cimammges imm interest rates. Time availability of sucim arm
asset would rescue snucim of time timeoretical results of
the snodermm capital pricismg asmni portfolio cimoice theo-
ries whielm are predicated on time existemmce of a riskiess
asset.24
Potential Impact of Indexation on Inflation
Ahthouglm indexation, by itself, would not prevent
price level changes, the advocates appear to believe
tmmFor a nhiseussiums of short— ammnl loimg—rumm Phillips cnn’es, see
Roger Spencer, “The Relation Bet’veemm Prices and Employ-
mnenst: Two Views,” this Reciew (March 1969), pp. 15-21.
24Marshail Saroat, “Purchasing Power Risk, Portfolio Analysis,
annl the Case far Iimnlex—Li,mked Bosmnls,” Journal of Money,
credit and Bunking (August 1973), pp. 836-45.
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indexatiosm would reduce imsfiation by reducing the
pressure for inflationary policies asmd by making anti-
inflationary policies more palatable. The opponents of
the proposal argue that indexation is likely to exacer-
bate inflation siimce by removing its stimmg, time con-
stituency for anti-inflationary policies would he weak-
ened. They recomnnmend more resolute anti-inflation
policies, but seldom provide aim analysis of the under-
lying force driving inflatiomm.
Wlmat is critically nmissimmg imm time argumesmt tlmat in-
dexation would lead to accelerating inflation is the
asmalysis of win’ ismflation occurs. 1mm time absence of any
ammaiysis as to time immcesmtives asmd time meclmammics of in-
flation, a case based on the fears of accelerating infla-
tion (which is conceded to be “functioniess” in terms
of distributive benefits) is not very persuasive.
As noted earlier, time proponents provide such an
analysis of inflation in terms of advocacy pohtics and
the share of resources commasmded by the government.
From this perspective of the diagnosis of inflation, it
is the government-deficit-induced increase in the
nominal money stock which underwrites persistent
inflation. The issue fundammmentai to the inflationary
implication of indexation, then, may be posed as: is
indexation more likely to lead to time abatenment of
pressures for policies whicis lead to inflation?
‘rime advocates of immdexation answer the query af-
firmatively. They cite the reduced incentives to pro-
mote inflationary policies under indexation as well as
the asserted reduction in the costs of anti-inflation
policies to bolster their case. Their case would be more
persuasive if one could accept tlmeir inmplicit premise
that taking the “honey” out of ismflation would reduce
the pressures for policies wlmich are likely to lead to
deficits, excessive mrmonetary groxvth, and the entailed
inflation. As was touched upon earlier imm discussing the
inflationary implication of moving into complete in-
dexatiosm from time immitial commdition of immflatiosmary dis-
equilibrium, their inmplicit prenmise is not based on a
firm foundation.
Why Attempt to Reduce Inflation Under
Complete Indexation?
The modern proponents of indexation seldom make
explicit what additional benefits they perceive for the
asserted abatenment of inflation if its distributional
effects are neutralized under indexation. Passing ref-
erences to the nuisance of bookkeeping changes are
made. However, the possible gain in allocative effi-
ciency associated witlm time inflationless solutions alluded
to earlier is seldom made. If, as the proponents argue,
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indexatiomm mmeutrahzes tlme distributive effects of immfla-
tion, isn’t the presumned ammti-inflation benefit of index-
ing simply superfious without some anmphfication of
time effects on resource allocation and balance-of-
payments developments?
In evnfiuatimmg time imalasmce-of-paymmments effects, one
must take ismto commsideratiomm time prevai]ismg foreigmm
exchammge rate systenm and wimether or not indexation
will lead to more or less inflation. Under a freely-
fluctuating exchange rate system, the case for indexa-
tiomm would mmot be affecteni by its balance-of-payments
effects, regardless of its effects on inflation; exchange
rates would simply change to reflect clmanging rates
of inflation. Under a fixed excimammge rate system,
however, the case for indexation wouid be greatly
attenuated if it results ism accelerated inflation, as some
opponents contend. This is so since time likely con-
sequences would include increased restrictions on
product and capital flows to cope witim the emerging
baiance-of-paymesmts difficulties.
A Recent Experience With Indexatio-n
and Inflation
Some of the proponents of indexation have cited
the example of Brazil as a ease in which adoption
of indexation lmas both reduced inflation and in-
creased growth of output. Interpretations differ as to
the role that iimdexatiosm playeni in time Braziliaim “mir-
acle.” Friednman suggests timat indexatiosm cosmtributed
both to accelerated growtim assd decelerated inflation.
Both Waiter W. Heller and Ronald A. Krieger tend
to emphasize the ineidesmtal contribution of indexation
to growth. Timey assert that tIme main spring of growth
was the enforced redistribution of immeome to capital
from labor which could have occurred only in a regi-
mented command ecosmonmy. Tlmey leave ummexplaismed
the deceleration of inflation.
Our reading of the Brazihan experience suggests
that botim occurresmces are time predictable effects of
conscious policy choices muade by the government
with the tacit approval of the populace. Time govern-
ment of Brazil replaced inflationary taxation as the
domninant form of a savings-investment tecimnology in
1964 with financing through capital nmarkets and di-
rect taxation.25 The motive for timis action was the
realization timat time yield of ismflationary finasmee lmad
atrophied alarmimmgiy as people increasingly made ad-
jusbmmemmts by sucim devices as capital flight abroad and
2~
DavidNI. Trubek, “Law, Planning and the Development of
the Brazilian Capital Market,” The Bulletin (New York:
New York University, April 1971), pp. 20-21.
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barter transactions. The consequent massive reforms
in tax iaws, tax admismistration, and in the capital
market regulations proved effective2°
Ingenious tax incentives, such as granting tax cred-
its for the purchase of shares in time so-called 157
Funds (specially created mutual investment funds),
which are then used to purchase new and secondary
equity issues, stinsulated the development of equity
markets and promoted savings.25 The government, in
effect, used the tax system to elicit savings, but rehed
on the newly developed capital market and the price
system to allocate time savimmgs timus created.
But the simmgle force which contributed most to the
decelerated inflatiosm was the government’s conscious
and deliberate policy of reducing deficits. The aban-
donment of inflation as a savings-investment technol-
ogy must he credited for checking inflation, not the
indexation per se. The adoption of indexation, coinci-
deimt witlm time move toward less inflationary policies,
served primarily to eliminate the inflation-induced
income distribution. Its contribution to the decelera-
tion of inflation was accommodative rather than
causal.
Economic growtlm in Brazil can he explained at
least partially in ternms of time increase in forced sav-
ings induced by chammged tax laws. In addition, the
increase in allocative efficiency arising from the mar-
ket direction of resource flows may be construed as a
contributing factor to the observed growth in Brazil.
It must be smoted that in Brazil there are relatively
small amounts of outstanding monetary contracts.
Since tIme existence of monetary contracts complicates
the implenmentatiomm of indexation, it is likely that
opposition to suclm a proposal would be more muted
in a country like Brazil than in the Usmited States.
Effect of Indexation on Existing Contracts
and Institutions
Professor Friedman strongly favored the issuance
of the purchasing power bond in 1951 and based the
continuation of his advocacy mainly on equity and
ethical grounds. He subsequently broadened the scope
16Ihid., pp. 22, 25. The Capital Market Law of 1965 author-
ized monetary correction for debt instruments and hank
deposits, and introduced authorized but smnissued shares.
The Law also removed effective barriers to indexation and
lending at positive real rates in an inflationary environment
with nsury limits of 12 percent, except in the short-term
letra market (a letrais comparable to a banker’s acceptance) -
27Ibid., pp. 56-65.
of isis proposal by immelunlismg private securities’ anni time
inconme tax systems (1973). Reinforced by the “eco-
nomic miracle” wrouglmt by Brazil with asm assist from
“monetary correction,” assd cosnpelIed by accelerating
inflation domestically, ime has recently mounted a
wgorous canmpaigmm for indexation reminiscemmt of his
advocacy of freely-fluctuating exchange rates and
monetarism.25
Writing 0mm October 29, 1973, he conjectured timat the
- time is ripe for private purchasing power bommds.
A breakthrough awaits only our imnaginative bond un-
derwriter.”20 The recently annosmnced issue by Citi-
corp, a bank holding compammy anchored by the First
National City Bank, New York, seems to be the re-
sponse to Friedman’s challenge. It has a provision for
a variable interest rate one percemst above the Treasury
bill rate and redemption options at face values twice
a year. This particular instrument mnay be interpreted
as a form of de facto purchasing power bond if one
regards changes in the Treasury bill rate as reflecting
only the changes in the actual, rather than the antici-
pated, inflation rate. To the extent that time changes in
the Treasury bill rate incorporate changes in the un-
derlying real interest rate. tlmis instrument would have
the added feature of reducing relative price risk as
well.30
In order to explaims the above assertion, let us an-
alyze the relationship which would hold between an
indexed and a smonimmdexed bond. Abstracting from
risk-aversion, at time time of issue time interest rate set
for a nonindexed bond would exceed the rate on an
indexed bond by the expected rate of inflation. As-
sume for simplicity that both are consols (bonds
without maturity dates) and the indexed bond is
protected for the full value of interest payments - What
would happen to the market (present) values of tlmese
bonds as inflationary expectations change? Market
value of the indexed bond would be invariant with
changed expectations of inflation, whereas that of
the nonindexed bond would suove inversely with the
changes. As far as the change in the real interest
rate is concerned, both bonds would be affected, but
the variability of the indexed bond would be greater
tm8
Milton Frienlosan, “Pmmrehasi,mg Power Bonds,” Newsweek,
12 April 1971, p. 86, and Friedman, “Econonmic Miracles,”
Newsweek, 21 lanuaw 1974, p. 80.
2m
’Milton Friedman, “More on Living With Inflation,” News-
week, 29 October 1973, p. 96.
~ “true” purchasing power bond protects the holder only
against price level changes, while leaving the holder vnl-
nenable to relative price changes, tlmat is, the risk of changes
in the real interest rate, which reflects the exchange rate
between present and future consumption options.
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for anticipated inflation.5~ Assuming risk aversion,
the relative attractiveness of the two bonds would
crucially depend on the perceived relative variability
of real immterest rates’ ‘and anticipated inflation rates.
If tlme market judged timat time expected rates of infla-
tion were more volatile than real interest rates, again
assuming risk aversion, the indexed bond would be
relatively more attractive. Thus, it would command
higher prices and lower effective yields; that is, a
borrower may borrow at lower yield with the indexed
bond than with the nonismdexed bond. Available evi-
dence from Israel is suggestive in this regard.tm2
The sometime advanced argument that the intro-
duction of indexed bonds would adversely affect the
price of existing bonds must then implicitly assume
that the mere introduction would raise either the ex-
pected rate of inflation, which is debatable, or the real
rate of interest, which is doubtful. Time market price
of existing bonds may be substantially below the orig-
inal sale price, but this would be unrelated to the in-
troduction of indexed bonds. The reduction wouldsim-
ply reflect the past history of muovements in the market
rates of interest, which reflect both the changes in the
real rate and the inflation rate.
Time introduction of indexed bonds would adversely
affect the issuer of new nonindexed bonds. Under the
assumed condition of relatively greater attractiveness
for indexed bonds, the implied higher costs of bor-
rowing for the incumbent borrowers measm lower
wealth for tlme incumbent “eonvesmtional” borrowers. If
there are legal impediments to issuing an indexed
bond (possibly clue to the statutory limits 0mm hotls the
lending and borrowing rates), the incumbents would
lose wealth as the new indexed bonds joined the com-
petition for funds.
It would not be surprising if those who stand to
lose by the innovation would try to block access to
the market in order to protect their wealth. The cur-
rent lively counter-offensive by the thrift institutions
to deny access to markets to the issuers of de facto
tm1
This is because the elasticities of nmarket values of indexed
and nonindexed eonsols with respect to a once-and-for-all
change in the real rate of interest can be shown, respec-
tively, as




rn + rnflo ±no
where fin, is the rate of inflation anticipated at the time of
contract formation, r, is the real rate of interest at the time
of contract formation, and r, is the real rate of interest at
time t subsequent to contract formation. See the appendix,
available on request, for demonstration.
:ssAlexander Rubner. “The Abdication of the Israeli Pound as
a Standard of Measnmremeot for Medium and Long-Term
Contracts,” Review of Economic Stuaies (October 1960),
pp. 69-75.
purclmasing power bonds is instructive in this regard°5
The foregoing suggests that it is not so much the
values of existing bonds hut the wealth of the exist-
ing equity owner and/or the viability of certain finan-
cial institutions wlmiclm are tlmreatened when indexed
hommcls are introduced xvitlmout appropriate elmanges
imm time whole spectrmmnm of legal asmd ismstitutional
arrangements.
The harriers to time introdnmetion of indexation by
the government and the private sectors are legal and
economic. Indexing of income taxes and the issuance
of index-linked government bommds would require leg-
islative acts and the required legislation appears to
entail significant political realignments. Opposition
would appear to be concentrated in thrift industries
sucim as savings and loan associations and mutual
savings banks. The motive underlyismg opposition to
indexation would appear to be the entailed loss in
wealth consequent to the introduction of indexation
wmthout any provisiomm to “socialize loss,” such as a
guaranteed purchase at par of the assets held by
these institutions.
As noted recently by Professor Friedman, indexing
ineomne taxes would help facilitate the introduction
of a private index-linked bond by exenmpting interest
adjustments fronm the income tax levy. Indexing gov-
ersmment securities would also stimulate the introduc-
tion of private indexed bonds by competitive forces
as well as by preempting the state usury restrictions
on loan contracts. The availability of index-linked in-
struments would facilitate the spread of indexation by
providing hedging opportunities to snmch financial in-
termediaries as savings and loan associations, life in-
surance companies, and commercial banks.
Longer-Term Contracts Would Result
Under indexation longer-term eosmtracts would likely
result — a development which, on net, could he re-
garded as a benefit. Under a nonindexed reginme mvith
high and variable rates of inflation, the tendency to-
ward shortening of maturity emerges because shom-t-
term instruments provide a relatively higher degree
of inconme and capital certainty. The above holds as
long as the perceived variability in the expected rates
of inflation is greater than timat imm time real interest
rate. The Israeli experience, referred to earlier, tends
to confirm timis view.
Effective indexatioms would simelter time parties to a
monetary contract from the effects of unammticipated
:ss”Savi,mgs Associations Oppose Proposed Citicorp Note Issue,
New York Times, 2 lnly 1974, p. 55.
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changes in the price level. However, time outcome
would be different from that of a smonimmdexed regime
only if changes in the price level timat occur are ins-
perfectly anticipated. The transaetors would eventu-
ally provide for anticipated cimanges in time price level
in their contracts. Tlme case for immdexatiosm, tlmerefore,
is essentially based 0mm tIme judgsnent timat ammticipations
about price level changes are neither unifonmm nor very
accurate. Since divergent price expectations tend to
restrict the extent of markets, indexation would ap-
pear to sisare most of time suerits of a maimmtainecl
stable price level which generates zero expectations
of price level change.
Appropriate Index Not Resolved
The claim of Irving Fisher, made over sixty years
ago, that the theory and tecimnique of index number
construction was advanced enough to provide a stand-
ard monetary yardstick, appears to have been pre-
mature.31 The debate on indexation forcefully redi-
rects our attention to a fundamental issue, namely,
what is inflation ammd imow do we nmeasure it?
The concept of inflation can he defirsed only for an
economy where nmoney buys goods and goods buy
money. Inflation is the sustained depreciation in the
purchasing power of mnoney and is measured by the
construction of an appropriate price index. The refer-
ence to appropriate is crucial in underscoring the
difficulty involved in any attempt to construct a gen-
eral price imdex. It brings into the open time funda-
mental issue of the appropriate universe of commodi-
ties in constructing the price index.
Should it commtaism intermediate goods or orsly final
goods? Simonid it include only newly- produced
goods and exclude all existing assets such as land
and imouses? Should it inelmmde only the currently pro-
duced flow of services (such as imousing services as
measured by implicit rental payments) and exclude
the currently produced sources of the future flow of
services (sucim as houses and automobiles)? Tlmese are
weighty and important issuesto wlmich satisfactory an-
swers are yet to be given, even at a purely con-
ceptual level.35 The potential divisiveness over the
choice of an appropriate index is discernible in labor’s





ssAnmmemm A. Alehian annl Beniammsin Klein, “On a Correct
Measnre of Inflation,” Journal of Money, Credit and Bank-
Mg, Part 1 (February 1973), pp. 173-91.
50
”Labor Bristles at a Broader CPI,” Business Week, 6 April
1974, p. 18.
SUMMARY
If we abstract from Imistory and igimore time inimerited
stock of outstanding immonetary contracts and special-
ized fissammcial immstitutiomms, time case for ismdexation ap-
pears persnmasive. It wotmlcl prevemmt time esmmergemmce of
an ummimmtesmdecl distribution of immeome and tlmerehv
serve time cause of fairmmess. If indexatiosm of income
taxes ammd government obligations facilitates aim effec-
tive elmeek on “usmautlmorized” growtim in time govermm-
memmt’s simare of resources, its adoptiomm would likely
lead to governnmemmt policies wimicim would moderate
time rate of immflatiomm rather tlsamm exaeerlmate it. Ismfla—
tionary policies would ismdeed lose cossstituency since
the “honey” mvould have beemm sucked from such
policies.
But, surely, time above reasonismg is immeomplete. It
leaves ummammswered time questiomm of lmow and mvimy time
simifting of time balance of political posver, required
to introduce indexation, xvommld occur. Indexation per
se would mmot cause the realigmsmemmt. Rather, realign-
ment, shommid it occmmr, would he a reflection of the
“exogenous” simift ism attitudes and distributiomms of ef-
fective political power.
We cansmot, however, escape from our past mmor re-
make the world anew at will by abolislming existing
nmonetary obligatiosms ammd financial immstitutions. We
imave an inimerited stock of monetary commtracts whicim
iImcorporate past expectations of the paths of price
level movements. Simotmld time ismtroduetion of indexed
bonds cause time previously imeld price expectations to
eimamsge, a fortuitous cimammge tim the relative wealth of
sellers and lsolders of outstasmdimmg monetary contracts
would ensue. Specifically, should time anticipated (and
experienced) rate of inflation fall as a consequence of
time introduction of ismclexed bonds, mmet monetary debt—
ors would lose wealth relative to mmet nmormetarv credi-
tors’-, conversely-, net creditors wommid lose wealtim rela-
tive to mmet debtors in time case where indexation
ismduces a Imiglmer anticipated rate of inflation tlman was
formerly held.
We imave a set of immstitutiomms operatimmg ummder ism—
imerited legal and regulatory comsstraints wimich restrict
their rammge of asset amid liability elmoices. Slmould imm-
dexation be perceived as inimical to time vested in-
terests of certaimm groups, oppositiosm to its adoption
would undoubtedly be mobilized in time absence of a
credible plan to “socialize” time total cost of transition.
Advocacy of indexation seldom is accompanied by
such a plan, and lsenee will be met by the organized
opposition of those wlmo are likely to be hm-t by its
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adoptiomm. Time oppositiomm will not likely he assuaged
by a demommstratiomm that indexatiorm will serve the
general interest.
We can discern the followissg timree possible de-
nouenments for imsdeximmg govermmmmmemmt revemmues ammd
obligations:
(1) Indexatloim may be adopted over opposition
through the contest of relative political power.
(2) Indexation nmay be adopted with the consent of
the former opposition when a credible plan to
compensate the potential losers is appended as
a rider. Stmch a plan may include a guaranteed
purchase at par of existing mortgages held by
thrift institutions.
(3) Indexation may, of eosmrse, be rejected even if
the balance of benefits over losses is shown to
be positive.
As noted earlier. imowever, a partial indexatiomm in
the spimere of private wage cosmtracts- and puimlic pen-
sioms comstracts is witlm us aireanly. The questiomm of
removing time legal barriers to ismdeximmg private bass
assd deposit cOmmtrnmcts still remaimms. TIme recent proposal
by time Canadiasm govermmmmment to “immflatiomm-proof” its
income tax structure nmav be time wave of time future.
The overridimmg questimsmm, imowever, is time degree of
restraismt that revemsmme immdexatinsmm wotmid inmpose 0mm time
govermmmnemmt’s demmmmmncm for a greater slmare of scarce
resources.
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